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The Roberts Court, the 2008 Election &
the Future of the Judiciary*
Professor David Franklin
PROFESSOR FRANKLIN: Thank you very much for that intro-
duction and thanks to the DePaul Business and Commercial Law
Journal for inviting me and to Don Carrillo for coordinating this ex-
cellent event. I have to say that along with feeling honored and flat-
tered by Don's invitation to speak today, I was also a little bit nervous.
I might as well tell you off the top why I was nervous. I'm not a
business or commercial law specialist. I do constitutional law. And
one thing that is sometimes true about constitutional law specialists is
that we often don't know all that much about the business world. I
became a little bit less nervous because Don explained to me that he
wanted me to talk about the Supreme Court. This was a relief to me
for two related reasons. First of all, I do know a little bit about the
Supreme Court and, second, the justices of the Supreme Court are a
little bit like me because they're also not business law specialists. I
don't want to say they don't know very much about the real world, but
it's possible.
Think for just a moment about the nine highly distinguished people
that currently serve on the Supreme Court. Of the nine, only three
have any significant experience as private practitioners-that would
be Justice Stevens, and this was a long time ago, Justice Kennedy, also
a fairly long time ago, and Chief Justice Roberts, who was in private
practice more recently. But Roberts's practice was a very specialized
appellate practice, largely-though not entirely-devoted to constitu-
tional issues.
So there is really nobody on the current Supreme Court who was a
titan of private practice, accustomed to working with business clients
on the highest levels, like, say, the second Justice Harlan or Abe For-
tas. The rest of the current justices came to the bench having been
government lawyers (that would be Scalia, Thomas, Alito, Roberts as
well, and to a lesser extent, Breyer and Souter) or public interest law-
* This is an edited version of the transcript from the luncheon at the DEPAUL BUSINESS AND
COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM, Lawyers, Law Firms & the Legal Profession: An
Ethical View of the Business of Law, held on May 1, 2008.
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yers (Ginsburg) or most distressingly of all, law professors (Scalia,
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kennedy). And all of them were judges before
becoming justices.
Incidentally, I think I'm correct in saying that the current Supreme
Court is the first Court ever, now that Rehnquist has died and
O'Connor has retired, on which all nine justices served as judges
before joining the Court. And this may well be the first Court ever on
which none of the justices was an elected official before becoming a
justice. At any rate, the result of all this background and experience is
that this is, I think, not a Court that is particularly attuned to, or for
that matter particularly interested in, business law as such or the day-
to-day concerns of the private bar in particular.
Now, it's true that John Roberts, during his confirmation process,
said some things to indicate that he would try to make the Court more
responsive to the concerns of practitioners. For example, Roberts said
he would try to increase the number of cases the Court grants for
plenary review through its certiorari process. Part of the reason for
that, he said, was that private practitioners need a little bit more gui-
dance, particularly ones that represent clients that do business nation-
ally and that are facing unclear or non-uniform law from the various
circuits.
Well, it hasn't worked. Last term the Court decided sixty-eight cases
that had been fully briefed and argued. That is the lowest number in
recent history. Twenty or twenty-five years ago the number was twice
as high, if not more. So we've got a Court that has not taken many
cases, that has members who have a background in public law, consti-
tutional law, that is not especially interested in business law, and now
you've got a constitutional law professor talking to you about the
Court.
What I thought I would do is try to turn this comparative disadvan-
tage of mine into some kind of advantage by talking for ten or fifteen
minutes about ways in which the Supreme Court's approach to busi-
ness law cases can be understood through the lens of constitutional
law because I think the Court largely views all of its cases through the
lens of constitutional law, for better or for worse.
More specifically, I'm going to outline three themes that have
played themselves out throughout the work of the Roberts Court over
its two and a half or three terms. These are three themes that, I think,
have their origin or find their fullest expression in constitutional law,
but that have also revealed themselves and have been echoed in the
Court's commercial law docket. The three themes I want to focus on
are these: first, a preference for rules over standards; second, an inter-
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est in narrowing access to courts, particularly federal courts; and third,
the unsettled question of federalism, the relation between the federal
and state governments.
Rules versus standards. We are obviously still very early in the ca-
reer of Chief Justice John Roberts, two and a half terms into it, but it's
already clear that one way in which Roberts is similar to Justices
Scalia and Thomas is that he has a strong preference for what he views
as clear, bright-line, judicially imposed rules as opposed to what he
views as broad, fuzzy, manipulable, open-ended standards. This comes
across very clearly in the constitutional area in a whole series of cases
from the First Amendment to the Dormant Commerce Clause and
beyond.
One of the most interesting manifestations of this trend for me
came in a recent case called Medellin v. Texas.' It would take us too
far afield from business law to talk at any length about this case, but it
was fascinating if only because it involved the Bush Administration
weighing in on the side of a Mexican immigrant in Texas who was
convicted of murder and on the side of the idea that an international
court's judgment should be given effect in Texas criminal courts.2 Inci-
dentally, the Bush Administration lost that case. 3 The current Court
tends to rule in favor of the current administration, but this was just
asking too much.
But what's interesting to me about Medellin is that Chief Justice
Roberts, who wrote the majority opinion, took great pains to say that
he was laying down a relatively clear rule on a very difficult issue in
constitutional law having to do with treaty interpretation. 4 And he
took equal pains to excoriate Justice Breyer's dissent for failing to
provide a clear rule and instead offering what Roberts mockingly
called a grab bag of seven different reasons for the dissent's outcome.5
This same trend of favoring formal rules, let's call them, over prag-
matic, functional, multi-factor standards comes across in the Court's
business cases as well. One prominent example which I'm sure many
of you are familiar with is the Stoneridge case, in which the Court
held, five-to-three with Breyer not participating, that securities fraud
claims are not allowed against third parties who don't directly mislead
1. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1361-63.
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investors but are in partnership in one way or another on a business
level with those who did.6
The primary effect of Stoneridge is to put an end to what some cir-
cuits had been calling scheme liability, where participating in a decep-
tive scheme exposed you to liability even if you didn't make any direct
statements yourself.7 The Court, Kennedy writing, clearly viewed
scheme liability as too open-ended, too unclear, too broad, and chose
instead to favor what it viewed as a clear rule of reliance which led to
a dismissal in that case. 8
Now, there are some exceptions to this trend toward rules over
standards. The most interesting exception, I think, is the Court's treat-
ment of the federal circuit in the patent area where it seems to me and
to many others that the Supreme Court is getting fed up with the fed-
eral circuit's bright-line rules, which happen to be very patent-
friendly, and is actually interested in replacing them with open-ended
standards in some areas. But that is an exception. The general trend is
clear.
Access to courts. This is probably the clearest and strongest theme
that has emerged from the Roberts Court, even more than the Rehn-
quist Court. This is a Court that seems determined to make it more
difficult in a variety of contexts for plaintiffs to get into federal court
in the first place, to survive motions to dismiss, motions for summary
judgment, and to get certified as a class.
We've been seeing this for many, many years in the constitutional
area. A very interesting recent constitutional case on this theme is
called Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, in which the Court
held that taxpayers did not have standing to get into federal court to
challenge the Bush Administration's so-called faith-based initiatives
program, but there are many, many other constitutional cases that fol-
low this trend.9
There are an enormous number of cases already in just two and a
half terms of business law at the Court that follow the trend as well.
Many of you are familiar with the Ledbetter case, in which the Court
held that a female employee alleging pay discrimination had to file a
lawsuit within 180 days of the very first time she got a smaller
paycheck because that was the single, discrete act of discrimination
that was actionable, even if she didn't know she was getting paid
6. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
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less.10 (It will be interesting to see if this leads to more discrimination
claims being filed, at least in the short term, as plaintiffs rush to make
sure they don't miss the deadline, even if they have no evidence of
discrimination.)
And the same pattern holds true in other areas. In securities law, I
already mentioned the Stoneridge case as an example of my first
theme, but it is also a great example of this second theme.11 And there
are a number of other securities cases, including Tellabs,' 2 in which
the Court made it somewhat more difficult to allege fraud; the Merrill
Lynch case,13 in which the Court made clear that the federal statutory
bar against class actions alleging misrepresentation in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities also precludes class actions alleging
fraud in connection with the holding of securities; and Credit Suisse,14
in which the Court barred antitrust claims in the context of IPO un-
derwriting practices.
Two cases decided together last term, Safeco and GEICO, cut back
on the ability of consumers to sue insurance companies under a fed-
eral credit-reporting law.15 In two other cases, Buckeye Check Cash-
ing 16 and Hall Street Associates,17 the Court continued to uphold
arbitration agreements that take cases outside the federal and state
court system.
And then there is the case that those of you who are litigators are
probably most familiar with, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,18 in which the
Court, in an antitrust case, swept aside Conley v. Gibson,19 a case that
had established for half a century the pleading standard on a motion
to dismiss.
This was a seven-to-two decision written by Justice Souter, not by
one of the so-called conservatives.20 The Court held that Conley's lan-
guage ("a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief")
has been questioned and criticized and explained away for long
10. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
11. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. 761.
12. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
13. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
14. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
15. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007).
16. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
17. Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
18. Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
19. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
20. Bell, 127 S. Ct. 1955.
20081
518 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
enough.21 "[A]fter puzzling the profession for 50 years," said Justice
Souter, "this famous observation has earned its retirement. The
phrase is best forgotten .... "22 Quite a way to treat a fifty-year-old
case that's been cited thousands of times! And of course Twombly
makes it harder for plaintiffs to survive motions to dismiss. 23 It will be
interesting to see whether the case is followed or distinguished by
lower courts. Judge Posner in the Seventh Circuit has already said it
needs to be viewed somewhat narrowly.2 4
But the trend there is again clear. There are exceptions, of course-
the State of Massachusetts was allowed standing to challenge the
EPA's refusal to regulate greenhouse gases-but the exceptions are
few and the trend is clear.25
Federalism. This theme is in many ways the most puzzling and inter-
esting to me. As many of you know, the Rehnquist Court seemed, for
about a decade, say from 1995 to 2005, to be embarked on a federal-
ism revolution-striking down federal laws as exceeding Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause or Congress's power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment or Congress's power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity-but then around the middle of the first decade
of this millennium the Rehnquist Court seemed to get cold feet, right
at the end of Rehnquist's life. There were cases that went in the other
direction, and some thought the federalism revolution was over.
So one key question about the Roberts Court, at least from a consti-
tutional law observer's standpoint, was: Where is Roberts going to
take the Court on federalism? Is the federalism revolution-returning
power to the states, striking down federal laws-going to pick up
steam again, or would the replacement of Rehnquist and O'Connor by
Roberts and Alito not make much of a difference? At this point I
think it's still too soon to know. But there are some early signs that
there is no revolution in the offing.
Those of you who do bankruptcy law may have noticed a case that
very few other people seem to have noticed, which is Central Virginia
Community College v. Katz, in which the Court rather astoundingly
declared that Congress's Article I bankruptcy power was sufficient to
overcome state sovereign immunity.26 So that points in the opposite
21. Id. at 1959-69 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46).
22. Id. at 1969.
23. Id.
24. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Viii. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797 (2008) (declining to extend
Bell, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
25. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
26. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
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direction from the Rehnquist federalism revolution, but O'Connor
was still on the Court and maybe Alito would have tilted it the other
way. (It was a five-to-four decision.)
It's true that there have been some cases in which the Court has
sided with state governments against the federal government-Gon-
zales v. Oregon,27 in which the Court invalidated the Justice Depart-
ment's attempt to stop doctors from assisting suicides in Oregon,
Massachusetts v. EPA28 and Medellin v. Texas,29 both of which I men-
tioned earlier-but all of those cases are sort of idiosyncratic and they
weren't really dominated by federalism issues.
Much more important, I think, on the federalism question have
been a series of cases from the Roberts Court on preemption. And
these really are business law cases. They're essentially tort law cases
with business defendants. The preemption issue is, of course, whether
federal law nullifies contrary or otherwise applicable state law.
Three cases from earlier this term are worth mentioning: a case
called Preston30 about the Federal Arbitration Act, a case called
Rowe3t about tobacco, and most interestingly, a case called Riegel.32
In the Riegel case, the Court decided by a vote of eight-to-one that
state law tort claims, product liability claims, are preempted by the
federal law that gives the Food and Drug Administration the authority
to grant pre-market approval to medical devices. 33 Now, that sounds
somewhat technical, but it's extraordinarily important to manufactur-
ers of medical devices.
The preemption cases are still all over the lot. Some of them go one
way, some of them go the other, but there does seem to be this very
interesting trend on the part of the Court towards a broad reading of
federal law to preempt state law that attempts to impose more restric-
tive requirements on defendants. I'm not going to pretend there is a
clear-cut pattern yet in the Supreme Court's approach to preemption
cases. Some studies have shown that over the past twenty to twenty-
five years preemption claims have been about a 50-50 bet in the
Court. What we can say is that the old presumption against preemp-
tion, which was never consistently followed, is now dead. If the Court
27. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
28. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497.
29. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
30. Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008).
31. Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008).
32. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
33. Id.
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was really focused on federalism as a constitutional value, one might
think it would embrace the presumption.
Riegel goes the opposite way.34 Take a listen to some of the broad
language of Justice Scalia's opinion. He says,
State tort law that requires a manufacturer's catheters to be safer,
but hence less effective, than the model the FDA has approved dis-
rupts the federal scheme. .. . A jury ... sees only the cost of a more
dangerous design, and is not concerned with its benefits...35
And Scalia went on to speculate that Congress's intent was one of
"solicitude for those who would suffer without new medical devices if
juries were allowed to apply the tort law of 50 States to all
innovations. '36
So here we've got a case that cuts against the federalism revolution
in favor of strong and broad federal power in a business law context or
at least a business defendant context, a result that is totally consistent
with narrowing access to court for state-law plaintiffs.3 7 I think it ex-
emplifies a profound skepticism on the part of most of the justices
about tort law as an efficient means of regulation, but it's also part of
a pattern of decisions favoring business defendants.
I'll close by just noting some broad statistics over the first two terms
of the Roberts Court. And maybe this is the strongest trend of all:
business defendants-and I'm including here business declaratory
judgment plaintiffs who are essentially in a defendant's posture-win
something like eighty-eight percent of the time (fifteen cases out of
seventeen). The Chamber of Commerce, when it enters a case as an
amicus, wins twelve times out of fourteen, eighty-six percent of the
time. When a business defendant has the solicitor general of the
United States on their side, then they win, again, some eighty to
ninety percent of the time.
So what we've got is a business-friendly Supreme Court, not neces-
sarily a Supreme Court that's interested in the concerns or issues sur-
rounding commercial law, but that is friendly to business, that is
interested in cutting back on access to courts, that seems to favor
bright-line rules over open-ended standards, and that is not as inter-
ested in federalism as it is in deregulation more generally. Those are
some themes. I'll end there, and I'd be happy to take questions that
you all may have about the Supreme Court.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1008.
36. Id. at 1009.
37. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009.
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A PARTICIPANT: Would you say that the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in the last ten years or so favoring commercial speech also relate
to this theme of the Court favoring business?
PROFESSOR FRANKLIN: Absolutely. The status of the speech of
corporations, particularly the speech of corporations that is in the
course of their business, was for a long time pitched at a lower level of
protection under First Amendment law than core political speech or
other highly-favored First Amendment speech. But, in recent decades
the Court's trend has been to elevate the status of commercial speech
relative to other speech and to remove restrictions on the ability of
corporations and unions to spend money in election campaigns.
The recent decision of the Court in the Wisconsin Right to Life case
is very much a business-favoring decision.38 And, yes, in the constitu-
tional area you see the sort of broad pro-business trend combining
with the Court's other trends in the First Amendment area, very much
in lock-step, absolutely.
A PARTICIPANT: Is the Roberts Court willing to scrap its own
precedent with regard to statutes like the Sherman Act?
PROFESSOR FRANKLIN: Let me repeat the question for those
who couldn't hear it. The Court recently held that vertical resale price
maintenance is not a per se violation of the Sherman Act, which it had
held for many decades, in fact for the better part of a hundred years,
and was henceforth going to be governed by the so-called rule of rea-
son, which doesn't mean that it can't be grounds for liability under the
Sherman Act but certainly makes it much, much harder for plaintiffs
to prevail. 39 And the question is: Does that indicate that the Roberts
Court is willing to scrap its own precedent at the drop of a hat?
I think the answer, broadly speaking, without sounding too cynical
about it, is: Not if lots of people are watching. What you've got is a
Court that is certainly interested in dispensing with a number of
precedents. This was an unusual case because the precedent was so
old and it was in the area of antitrust, which is not politically salient in
the way that abortion or capital punishment or affirmative action are,
but in that case the Court did overrule precedent. 40 It did the same
thing with Conley in the Civil Procedure context, which is also not an
area that attracts a lot of front-page headlines, 41 but when you move
over to the hot button issues, the First Amendment, abortion rights,
38. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
39. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
40. Id. (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)).
41. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41 (1957)).
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constitutional law more generally, what you find in the Roberts Court
is a chipping away or a gradual distinguishing of precedent without
actually overruling it.
For example, the Hein case that I mentioned earlier in which the
Court said no standing for taxpayers who want to challenge the faith-
based initiatives program, it took a forty-year-old precedent from the
dying days of the Warren Court and distinguished it almost to the
point of invisibility without overruling it.42
It was a case that said taxpayers should have standing if their claim
arises under the Establishment Clause, which deals with separation of
church and state.43 And the Court in Hein said, well, we don't want to
overrule that, but it only applies to cases where Congress has violated
the Establishment Clause by specifically appropriating money that
may go to religious organizations. 44 Here all we've got is Congress
giving a lump sum of money to the executive branch out of which the
executive branch is running a faith-based initiative and feeding
lunches like this to people in order to tell them how wonderful
churches are in delivering social services. 45
So that expedient of distinguishing earlier cases, defining them nar-
rowly, restricting them to their facts, is I think a much more common
way that the current Court goes about dealing with stare decisis when
it doesn't like the precedent that it's facing.
A PARTICIPANT: Justice Scalia was recently on 60 Minutes, and I
think Leslie Stahl thought he was a nice guy and originally I think was
intimidated by him. What's going on now, are all the justices going to
go out and promote their own personalities? Is the Court now an en-
trepreneur? Do they want to make money?
PROFESSOR FRANKLIN: So the question is about Justice
Scalia's recent interview on 60 Minutes, but more broadly about
whether the Justices are taking on a more public role. Each of the nine
of them has his or her own approach to this. I don't know Justice
Scalia personally. He seems to be a genuinely nice guy. My sense is
that he has become increasingly frustrated with the fact that he often
cannot get a majority of the Court to go along with his rather bold
vision of constitutional law.
And you know, it's nice to have a job for life, but you're also stuck
with these other eight people for life. Was it Justice Holmes who
42. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (distinguishing Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)).
43. Flast, 392 U.S. 83.
44. Hein, 127 S. Ct. 2553 (distinguishing Flast, 392 U.S. 83).
45. Hein, 127 S. Ct. 2553.
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called them nine scorpions in a bottle? It's not necessarily the most
fun environment after fifteen or twenty or thirty years.
So yes, Scalia has been doing more and more speaking out. Thomas
has his memoir. But on the other hand, we've got Justice Souter who
is absolutely allergic to any kind of public notoriety. And I think the
same largely can be said of Justice Ginsburg, for instance; she's not
interested at all in speaking out.
I think it will be interesting to see what happens on the question of
cameras in the courtroom. There is some movement in Congress to try
to require the Court to videotape their sessions. The Justices have re-
sisted this very, very strongly. On the part of someone like Scalia, the
argument is that if you start putting sound bites of our arguments on
the nightly news, it will all be caricatured and reduced to meaningless
or non-representative sorts of discussions. If you talk to someone like
Justice Souter, he doesn't want to be videotaped because he doesn't
want people to know what he looks like. But on the other hand, Chief
Justice Roberts, I think, is himself more media-savvy. I think Roberts
probably favors the idea of cameras in the courtroom. But that will be
an issue that tests your question of how interested the Court is in pub-
lic scrutiny or public notoriety.
A PARTICIPANT: It seems to me from what you've been saying
though in terms of what has been going on is something perhaps that
one could have expected from the Court in a shifting towards a con-
servative-based Court that is going to favor business over the individ-
ual rights of consumers and in many ways all across the board. Isn't
that the case?
PROFESSOR FRANKLIN: Yes. I don't think there's anything par-
ticularly unexpected about any of the sort of trends or trajectories that
I've been talking about. One of the myths about Supreme Court Jus-
tices is that they're kind of a black box, that the president appoints
and the Senate confirms a justice, but you never really know how
they're going to evolve or change when they get onto the Court. And I
think it's a myth.
There are certainly examples of justices who disappointed the peo-
ple who appointed them. Harry Blackmun is one example. To some
degree David Souter is another example, although anyone who knew
David Souter would know what they were getting, which was a basi-
cally moderate, old-fashioned, thorough, careful jurist.
But for the most part, you know, what you see is what you get. And
particularly, I think, when presidents appoint justices who've spent a
significant amount of time working for the executive branch, in the
White House, in the Justice Department, as a prosecutor, they can
2008]
524 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:513
usually count on having a justice on the Supreme Court who, broadly
speaking, will share their ideology on the important issues of the day.
Now, the issues of the day today will not be the issues of the day
twenty or thirty years from now. I don't presume to know how Rob-
erts or Alito will vote on issues that, because of evolving technology,
we can't even predict. But on issues we can predict, we knew they
were going to be conservative and they are. We knew that Scalia and
Thomas were going to be conservative, and they are. We knew that
Kennedy was somewhat less conservative, but largely conservative,
and he is. So absolutely predictable, yes.
Thank you all very much. Enjoy the rest of the day.
